First, the decisions that are of no particular interest:
CEDRIC KUSHNER PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. KING, No 00-549
A person who is the president and sole shareholder of a closely held corporation, acting within the scope of his authority as corporate employee, may be distinct from the "enterprise" for purposes of 18 USC 1962(c), the RICO statute. [This, and subsequent summaries are from Findlaw]
ALABAMA v. BOZEMAN, No 00-492
Under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, states receiving criminal defendants prior to the termination of a sentence in another state may not arraign the defendant and then return the prisoner before trial.
NGUYEN v. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., No 99-2071
8 USC 1409(a), setting forth citizenship requirements for one born out of wedlock and abroad to a citizen father and a noncitizen mother, does not violate equal protection simply by use of gender specific terms because of the biological difference between the parents.
KANSAS v. COLORADO, No 105
Money damages for violation of the Arkansas River Compact do not violate the Eleventh Amendment because the parties to the compact are states, not citizens, and the unliquidated nature of the money damages does not bar an award of prejudgment interest.
Now the two crucial decisions that were put off:
KYLLO v. US, No 99-8508
This refers to the case where police used thermal imaging technology to discern abnormal heat emissions from a house that was thought to be used to grow marijuana plants. The previous appeals courts had issued a somewhat vague ruling that allowed passive imaging that did not reveal anything more than basic heat emissions. This decision appears to have made thermal imaging for this purpose unconstitutional:
(c) Based on this criterion, the information obtained by the thermal imager in this case was the product of a search. The Court rejects the Governments argument that the thermal imaging must be upheld because it detected only heat radiating from the homes external surface. Such a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was rejected in Katz, where the eavesdropping device in question picked up only sound waves that reached the exterior of the phone booth to which it was attached. Reversing that approach would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology including imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the home. Also rejected is the Governments contention that the thermal imaging was constitutional because it did not detect intimate details. Such an approach would be wrong in principle because, in the sanctity of the home, all details are intimate details. See e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705; Dow Chemical, supra, at 238, distinguished. It would also be impractical in application, failing to provide a workable accommodation between law enforcement needs and Fourth Amendment interests. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 181. Pp.712.
GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENT. SCH., No 99-2036
Under New York law, respondent Milford Central School (Milford) enacted a policy authorizing district residents to use its building after school for, among other things, (1) instruction in education, learning, or the arts and (2) social, civic, recreational, and entertainment uses pertaining to the community welfare. Stephen and Darleen Fournier, district residents eligible to use the school' s facilities upon approval of their proposed use, are sponsors of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children ages 6 to 12. Pursuant to Milford' s policy, they submitted a request to hold the Club' s weekly afterschool meetings in the school. Milford denied the request on the ground that the proposed use -- to sing songs, hear Bible lessons, memorize scripture, and pray -- was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. Petitioners (collectively, the Club), filed suit under 42 U. S. C. 1983, alleging, inter alia, that the denial of the Club's application violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
And the decision:
1. Milford violated the Club' s free speech rights when it excluded the Club from meeting after hours at the school.
. . .
(b) By denying the Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, Milford discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause. That exclusion is indistinguishable from the exclusions held violative of the Clause in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384, where a school district precluded a private group from presenting films at the school based solely on the religious perspective of the films, and in Rosenberger, where a university refused to fund a student publication because it addressed issues from a religious perspective.
Other U.S. Supreme Court Cases can be found at their website.